Introduction
In August 2018, I was awarded the inaugural Australian Tactical Medical Association (ATMA) study grant to attend the International Public Safety Association (IPSA) Fall 2018 Symposium in Virginia, United States of America (USA) and conduct research in tactical medical methodologies utilised by first responders.
This report outlines the outcomes of my objectives for the study grant: 1) Record the content and lessons learnt by attendance at the International Public Safety Association (IPSA) 2018 Fall Symposium; and 2) Explore tactical medical methodologies, particularly within law enforcement and its application to Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) response.
The IPSA Fall 2018 Symposium primarily focused on MCIs and the planning, response and recovery to such incidents by first responders, such as Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs), Paramedics/Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Firefighters and other emergency personnel.
Due to operational sensitivities, some information or conversations from engagements is redacted. This, however, has not affected the substance of this report nor its recommendations.
My goal for this study grant is to promote awareness and education to groups or organisations which have had limited exposure to tactical medical methodologies or MCIs. Through simple knowledge and equipment, survivability amongst victims and first responders can be significantly improved.
Arlington County (Police and Fire/EMS)
Having developed the Rescue Task Force (RTF) model, Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) is at the forefront of Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) and Warm Zone care. ACFD has a dedicated High Threat Response Program (HTRP) who develop, train and integrate members of their FD and Arlington County Police Department (ACPD) to improve response capability at MCIs.
Annual training provided to ACFD and ACPD includes refreshers for TECC principles and related equipment (such as tourniquets and chest seals). Scenariobased training is provided to ACFD & ACPD by utilising 'dispatch' to send available units to an approximately onehour event before returning to regular duties.
Evident was inter-operability and effective working relationships between agencies, with training being conducted at the same location and regularly involving both agencies. Coupled with this interoperability training, is the reinforcement by trainers of 'Unified Command'.
The training delivery focuses on TECC guidelines, however, I identified two fundamental principles. The first is the priorities of life (in descending order):
1. After four hours, the incident ended with Dallas PD deploying a robot rigged with C4 into a toilet where the offender had retreated. It was detonated, killing the offender and making history as the first time American Law Enforcement had used explosives as a use of force. 12 Police Officers had been shot, five of which killed, two civilians wounded and 300 casualties would soon present themselves to nearby hospitals.
Dr Eastman provided a first-hand account of the incident as a member of the Dallas PD Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team; Medical Director for the Dallas PD and as medical director for The ReesJones trauma center at the nearby Parkland hospital. Providing immediate response to the incident from four blocks away, Dr Eastman describes the chaos as he approached the scene, with vehicles abandoned and members of the public screaming, running and filming the incident. The sound of gunfire from the offender's weapon ricocheted through the CBD area and Police were unsure of how many offenders were involved.
Situational awareness is key, as Dr Eastman broke it down to the following key points:
 Radio communications during the incident were calm for the most part.  Police officers provided TECC to injured officers, which saved their lives.  The fog of war is real, Police had no idea what was going on.  The hot/warm/cold zone could not be defined (the offender was moving and these zones were constantly changing).  The first 6 to 10 minutes is crucial, particularly in the provision of medical care.  The non-traditional (medical)  providers made the difference (civilians and Police).
In relation to communications, Dr Eastman makes the following points: 'Stop the Bleed', a program initiated to empower members of the public to engage in life saving haemorrhage control saves lives and is a program that should continue to be implemented to the community.
Dr Eastman draws attention to the fact that in any disaster, the long term psychological impact is far greater than the initial impact and we need to care for ourselves and each other.
'Psychological first aid' is a new program that Dr Eastman is actively promoting. Sadly, there are Dallas LEO's who no longer protect the community and the oncall surgeon for this MCI is no longer practicing.
The USA is experiencing an increase in the frequency, severity and visibility of MCI. Offenders are modifying tactics to increase effectiveness, such as adopting positions of elevation and using objects such as vehicles as weapons. The resulting wound profiling is not often seen by Emergency Medical Services (EMS) or medical professionals. The majority of these attacks create complex injury patterns, such as one or more penetrating trauma injuries, blunt trauma and burns. These injury patterns mirror military wounding profiles and present a challenge for civilian first responders. Dr Jerge describes this setting as a 'civilian combat zone'.
An MCI or active threat scenario requires a different medical response with Dr Jerge stressing the need to incorporate combat medical principles into the civilian arena. She questioned why the current treatment paradigm is ABCDE, noting the low preponderance of death from airway obstruction in these circumstances. Recent examples include the Pulse nightclub shooting.
In man-made MCI, the triage of patients is much more difficult. There is normally an active, on-going threat with complex mechanisms of injury. In the Virginia tech shooting, the over-triage rate was 69% (Turner, Lockey, & Rehn, 2016 (R v. Martin Bryant, 1996) brought the scope of man-made incidents to the forefront, it had been almost 20 years since a mass shooting in Australia.
As events at Lindt Café unfolded, the initial EMS/paramedic response was coded as an 'R8 special event' to assist the NSW Police Force, Tactical Operations Unit (Police Tactical Group). There was no '000' (emergency call) to NSWAS nor any understanding of what the initial responding members were attending. Mr Ellis outlines the following issues and lessons.
Attendance:
 NSWAS was initially staged in a hot zone with a line of sight to the Lindt Café.  Command Posts were geographical difficult to access and scattered, with no true Unified Command. John Reed provided a personal and genuine presentation on an event which few first responders have experienced, and one even fewer are able to talk so openly and publicly about. A TCCC instructor, T-EMS element leader and 30-year EMS veteran, Mr Reed provides a qualified presentation focusing on preparedness and effects on the community as a result of an event like this.
On 14 December, John Reed was on-duty in a neighbouring area outside Newtown, providing ambulance services. When first hearing of the incident at SHES, Mr Reed knew it was in neighbouring Newtown and initially thought it wouldn't be his problem. Not long after, he was dispatched to the incident, swapping out his ambulance for a 'fly-car' (non-transporting EMS vehicle) to provide a rapid and tactical medical (T-EMS) response.
As Mr Reed arrived at the scene, neighbouring Newtown EMS departed with two paediatric patients, leaving Mr Reed as the only EMS at the scene. He was never told it was an active shooter incident, nor did he have any idea about the traumatic event that he was going into.
Upon entering the school, Mr Reed distinctly recalled the haze of gunpowder and sensory overload. As he turned left and approached the first classroom, a Police Officer maintained the entryway to the classroom. Upon moving into the room, Mr Reed observed 17 casualties, all with catastrophic injuries (not compatible with life). Mr Reed moved to the second classroom to see further victims, again all with catastrophic injuries and the shooter with a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head.
Despite no victim being viable, Mr Reed quickly formulated a plan of action understanding the scrutiny that the first responders would soon face. Without any additional EMS or Fire support, Mr Reed conducted a full assessment of each victim and ensued triage was complete (with all casualties assessed as deceased).
In his admirable account, Mr Reed focuses on the post-incident effects to the first responders and the community as a whole. The coming days were a total blur for Mr Reed however he returned back to work shortly after the incident. Rumours circulated that Mr Reed and others had self-dispatched, even though this wasn't the case. 4 days post the incident, an FBI psychologist conducted a debriefing with Mr Reed, informing him he had PTSD and was 'broken' from the incident, making him feel worse and further deteriorating his condition. Mr Reed described this debrief as a complete waste of time that did not help at all. Instead, Mr Reed promoted talking to the other first responders involved in the incident as the best support.
Mr Reed makes the following key points relating to MCIs.
Planning:
 Understand and develop a mindset that this can happen to you and your family.  Develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for MCIs.  Get EMS involved in planning and training.  TECC training is essential for first responders.  All agencies need to train in TECC together.
Response and Recovery:
 A response to these incidents must be a team approach by all agencies.  Keep additional first responders away from the aftermath, they don't need to see it.  Keep first responders away from the media.  The town was overwhelmed, especially when additional resources were required to deal with the subsequent presidential and other VIP visits.  There must be an after-action debriefing.  Questions need to be asked, are these people ready to go back to work? What process is in place to support them?
Whilst all these points have merit, the two central points from Mr Reed's presentation were:
1) It will happen to you, so prepare for an incident like this (Newtown was a small town in an affluent area of Connecticut).
2) Post-incident management of first responders is vital. The prevailing discussion point through this study grant was the requirement for an effective interagency capability and role appreciation to ensure an adequate response to MCIs.
A once-a-year 'sugar hit' of interagency training is insufficient to meet inter-agency operational effectiveness. Integrated TECC training, as well as an on-going and diverse array of activities (e.g. training, tours and exercises) between each echelon of agencies, is required to truly achieve this recommendation.
Recommendation 3: Australian law enforcement and related agencies employ Medical Officers to oversee medical capabilities.
Responsibility for the medical direction, capability and training of larger USA law enforcement agencies is through the appointment of a medical officer. Given the larger size of law enforcement agencies in Australia (when compared to the average in the USA), there is a need for the appointment of suitability qualified medical officers. These appointments would ensure each agency is current with the needs of the community and medical best-practice, with a by-product of mitigation to corporate risk relating to medical capabilities. Australian law enforcement officers should be equipped to provide medical aid for injuries they most frequently observe: Trauma. Core skills such as CPR are critical however, Police officers are more likely to come across trauma-related injuries through their daily duties.
A law enforcement officer's capabilities should include live-saving interventions commonly required in the treatment of trauma injuries. These treatments should include but not be limited to massive haemorrhage, tension pneumothorax, airway obstructions and hypothermia. Implementation of this recommendation would positively influence survivability for casualties of trauma.
Recommendation 5: Australian Government commission a committee to assess and enhance first responder medical capability at MCIs.
USA agencies have identified the need for a collaborative approach across agencies and jurisdictions. Whilst there is no official committee within the USA Federal Government, they have made significant headway through agencies or programs such as the Committee for TECC, DHS 'Stop the Bleed', National Fire Protection Association 3000™ and IPSA.
In Australia, ATMA actively promotes the improvement of first responder medical capabilities however the country requires a committee or other syndicate to provide direction and policy recommendation to state and federal government agencies and the private sector. This committee should be commissioned and endorsed by the Australian Government for legitimacy and strategic emphasis. This committee should be made up of agency medical officers (as described in Recommendation 3) and an array of representatives to ensure adequate and best-practice medical capabilities exist for MCIs.
Recommendation 6: Australian agencies commission timely after-action assessments for MCIs, to ensure that lessons learnt are available with minimal delay.
The USA has identified a need for information and lessons learnt from an MCI to be disseminated as soon as practicable after the incident. Whilst 44 recommendations were made during the inquiry into the Lindt Café siege, these recommendations took 890 days to be presented from the time of the incident. (Coroners Court of New South Wales, 2017) Comparatively, the Las Vegas Shooting After-Action Report was completed 327 days after the incident.
A major emphasis within the USA is to review and relay information from MCIs to other first responders to assist in their preparation and response to the next incident. This recommendation is not to deter, remove or change any judicial process (coronial inquiry etc.) but to provide a mechanism for timely information to first responders and their parent agencies.
